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Unﬁnished Business in the
Macroeconomics of Low Inﬂation:
A Tribute to George and Bill 
by Bill and George
THE RETIREMENT OF GEORGE Perry and William Brainard as editors of
the Brookings Papers gives us an opportunity to say publicly what we
have often said privately: the Brookings Papers is an important national
institution. It is important because it has set the right tone for U.S. macro-
economic policy. George and Bill are both Keynesians, not just in the nar-
row tradition of IS-LM models with Phillips curves, but also in their
broader methodological approach to macroeconomics. The Brookings
Papers has always reﬂected their view that macroeconomics should be a
pragmatic and judicious mixture of theory and common sense, informed
by statistical analysis. That of course reﬂects the methodology of Keynes,
throughout his life and especially in The General Theory. We think that
U.S. macroeconomic policy has beneﬁted enormously from such a bal-
anced pragmatic-empirical approach.
Anyone who doubts the beneﬁts of such an approach to macroeconom-
ics needs only look to the north—to Canada—where doctrinaire use of an
extreme form of natural rate theory in the 1990s led policymakers to
push inflation too low, resulting in an unusually wide unemployment gap
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10922-04a_Akerlof_rev.qxd  1/25/08  11:10 AM  Page 31relative to the United States. This is just one example where a more
empirical, more nuanced macroeconomics—such as presented for the last
thirty years in the Brookings Papers—has implications for national wel-
fare. Macroeconomic policy, as no one appreciated better than Keynes,
often even makes the difference between prosperity and depression.
It will be a hard task for the new editors to take the place of George and
Bill, and we wish them luck. Neither this Bill nor this George has ever
envied George and Bill their difficult job. They have edited the Brook-
ings Papers the hard way. The easy way is to trawl the conferences and
the economics department hallways for the best of what already exists.
Instead, for the most part, George and Bill recruited people to push for-
ward their pragmatic agenda for macroeconomic research. The inﬂuence
of George and Bill, even in the late stages of producing these papers, is
clear to all members of the Brookings Panel. We have continued to be
amazed at how George and Bill could take the meeting drafts, which were
not always in the best of shape, and quickly turn them into interesting,
readable gems. In short, they have done the impossible: admittedly with
some very good help from their authors, they have produced something
like eight to twelve signiﬁcant and relevant new papers on macroeconom-
ics per year, year after year.
Some Background on This Paper
This volume in honor of George Perry and William Brainard is an
opportunity to reﬂect back on the two Brookings Papers we wrote with
Perry (with comments and occasional help from Brainard) on the macro-
economics of low inflation.
1 Although they took somewhat different
approaches, these two papers had similar policy implications. Both found
a signiﬁcant cost of permanently low inﬂation in terms of permanently
high unemployment.
Each paper examined the effects of a different type of money illusion.
The earlier paper, “The Macroeconomics of Low Inﬂation,” examined the
consequences of downward nominal wage rigidity, or resistance to nomi-
nal wage cuts. “Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting” examined the con-
sequences of people thinking in nominal rather than in real terms when
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inﬂation and unemployment—not just in the short run, but also in the long
run when actual inﬂation and expected inﬂation are equal.
Although the existence of such a trade-off was previously well known,
its magnitude was not. Both papers found surprisingly large long-run
increases in unemployment from permanent reductions in inﬂation to
zero. For example, in the benchmark simulation in the ﬁrst paper, with
limited nominal wage cuts for continuing workers, we found that a perma-
nent reduction in annual inﬂation from 2 percent to zero would increase
unemployment by 1.5 percentage points; when we estimated a benchmark
Phillips curve using time-series data, unemployment increased perma-
nently by 2.6 percentage points. In the benchmark “ignored expectations”
simulations, a decline in annual inﬂation from 2.6 percent to zero yielded
a 1.5-percentage-point increase in unemployment.
2 The preferred param-
eter estimates for our empirical model imply that moderate inﬂation will
reduce unemployment by between 1.9 and 3 percentage points from what
it would be with no inflation at all.
3 The exact size of these trade-offs
depends on the speciﬁc values of the parameters or the speciﬁc equations
we estimate. But literally hundreds of simulations and estimates point to
the same conclusion. There is a signiﬁcant permanent trade-off between
inﬂation and unemployment when inﬂation is low.
Why did these papers ﬁnd such signiﬁcant trade-offs? And why did they
obtain these results so robustly? Both papers rely on one crucial assump-
tion. Here we shall explain what that assumption is, why it is so crucial,
and why, now as then, we think it is well justified. We welcome this
opportunity not just to reminisce about the fruitful collaboration we had
with George Perry, our coauthor on these papers as well as our editor, and
with Bill Brainard, about a decade ago. By putting our results in a new
perspective, we shall also complete some important unﬁnished business.
Two Calculations
The models presented in both papers posit a notional wage. This is the
wage that ﬁrms would pay in the absence of any money illusion. In the
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wage rigidity; in the second, it was due to failure, at low levels of inﬂa-
tion, to incorporate inﬂationary expectations into the wage bargain. These
manifestations of money illusion give rise to a wedge. At each level of
employment this wedge causes a tendency for real wages to be perma-
nently higher than the notional wages that emerge from the real wage bar-
gains by an amount S(π), where π is the rate of inﬂation. This wedge
persists even in the long run when its effects are fully anticipated. Since
S(π) declines as inﬂation rises, equilibrium unemployment will rise as
inﬂation falls.
We can then decompose the analysis into two parts. The ﬁrst part asks:
How large is S(π)? Or, equivalently, what is the seemingly exogenous
tendency for real wages to be lower because inﬂation is π rather than
zero? The second part asks: What change in unemployment results from
this shift S(π)? Or, equivalently, what is the S-multiplier?
It seems natural that if S is expressed in percentage terms, the effects
on employment can be obtained by multiplying S by the elasticity of
demand for labor. This, in turn, suggests low estimates of the effects of S
on unemployment. Daniel Hamermesh’s 1996 survey reports that micro-
econometric studies of the elasticity of demand for labor ﬁnd it to be in
the range of 0.2 to 0.9.
4 This would then suggest that the effect of inﬂation
on unemployment is in the range 0.2 S(π) to 0.9 S(π).
It turns out, however, that this method of calculation is not correct for
several reasons, one of which is that it ignores changes in the aggregate
supply of labor. In the theoretical models presented in our two papers, we
showed that one could approximate the impact of changing rates of inﬂa-
tion on equilibrium unemployment by dividing S(π) by the slope of the
short-run price Phillips curve. (To be precise, that slope is the change in
price inﬂation with respect to the rate of unemployment in the short run,
when expectations about inﬂation are ﬁxed.) That use of the slope of the
Phillips curve raises the following question: With a wedge of S(π), how
much additional unemployment induces actual prices to equal expected
prices? It turns out that the S-multiplier is the inverse of the slope of the
price Phillips curve. Conventionally, it is believed that such slopes are
approximately 1⁄2; so multiplying the difference S(0) − S(π) by 2 gives the
reduction in unemployment from permanently increasing inﬂation from 0
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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times as high as from the labor demand approach.
This then takes us to our unﬁnished business. Why did we not obtain
estimates that were very much lower than we did? Where is Waldo? That
is, where is the elasticity of demand for labor? Here we shall construct a
model that shows where the elasticity of demand for labor is hiding,
namely, as a term in the price Phillips curve. It turns out that the slope of
that Phillips curve reﬂects two factors. The ﬁrst of these is the relationship
between (notional) wages and employment in the wage setting equation
that can be thought of as the aggregate elasticity of supply of labor. The
second is, as intuition dictates, the elasticity of demand for labor.
But here the theory and our derivation turn out to be useful because
“the demand for labor” is an ambiguous term. For example, one simple
microeconomic deﬁnition of the demand for labor is employment by an
individual ﬁrm or individual industry as a function of its own wage, with
aggregate income and the prices and wages of other ﬁrms or industries
ﬁxed. The conventional macroeconomic demand for labor asks a different
question: How will employment change for all ﬁrms if the real wages for
all of them, and aggregate income, are changing? This is the appropriate
demand concept in our formula for the S-multiplier. We shall argue that
this elasticity, in contrast to the conventional microeconomic estimates of
the elasticities, is sufﬁciently large to be fully consistent with our high
values for the S-multiplier.
The micro and the macro concepts of the demand for labor will also dif-
fer depending on whether capital is assumed to be ﬁxed or variable. As we
shall see, for the macroeconomic deﬁnition relevant for the S-multiplier,
the elasticity of demand, which is high when capital is ﬁxed, is still higher
when capital is variable. The consistency with our previous estimates is
thus unaffected by considering capital as either ﬁxed or variable.
The Theory
We adapt a model from Charles Bean’s survey of European unemploy-
ment.
5 Thus, all of the assumptions are rather standard.
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In the usual theory of the Phillips curve, the rate of inﬂation is the sum
of two components. By deﬁnition, the rate of inﬂation is (approximately)
where pt denotes the log of the price level at time t. Next pt − pt−1 can be
decomposed into two terms:
where p
e
t is the log of the expected price level at time t (with those expec-
tations made at t − 1). The second bracketed term in equation 2 is (approx-
imately) the rate of inﬂation expected at time t − 1 (since pt−1 is known at
t − 1); we shall denote it as π
e
t. The ﬁrst bracketed term is the (log of the)
desired price of a representative firm relative to the expected general
price level. According to equation 2, then, inflation in excess of expecta-
tions depends upon the extent to which this desired price exceeds the
expected price. As can be seen, inflation will be equal to expectations if
this desired price equals the expected price.
A Phillips curve then develops from the determination of relative
prices. It is the result of two considerations. The ﬁrst is the markup of
prices over variable costs. The second is what those variable costs might
be. We begin by describing the price markup.
The Price Markup
We shall assume that the ﬁrm produces output according to the follow-
ing production function:
where Qt is output, Nt is employment, and Kt is the capital stock. We
assume that the ﬁrm faces a demand function for its product of the form
where  Dt is the demand for the firm’s product, Yt is aggregate real
demand, Pt is the price charged by the individual firm for its product,
and P
–
t is the average price level for the whole economy. β, of course, is
the price elasticity of demand for the product of this representative firm.
Note that we have made demand for the product of this firm propor-
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will be proportional to aggregate income for a given relative price of its
product.
This yields a familiar equation, which says that the ﬁrm hires labor
until the marginal revenue product is equal to the real wage:
where M is the markup factor, which will be β/(β−1); Wt is the nominal
wage; and Pt is the price of the ﬁrm’s product.
Variable Costs: Wages
We write the equation for the notional real wage then as
where ut is the rate of unemployment. In a longer paper we would derive
this relationship from microeconomic assumptions as our 1996 and 2000
papers did, but such a relationship can be derived from a wide range of
bargaining, efﬁciency wage, or search models. We assume that all ﬁrms
treat this wage as the exogenously given supply price for labor.
The Effects of Money Illusion
To consider the consequences of either money wage rigidity or ignored
inﬂationary expectations, we must then describe the additional effect on
wage outcomes. We shall illustrate here with money wage rigidity. Our
paper on downward wage rigidity described how censoring of negative
wage changes caused a tendency for wages to be higher than the notional
relation in equation 6. This censoring occurs because of workers’ reluc-
tance to take cuts in money wages (and perhaps also ﬁrms’ reluctance to
give them). Such stickiness causes a tendency for money wages to be
higher than they would be otherwise by an amount S, which depends on
inﬂation π. The lower is π, the more frequent (and larger) will be the trun-
cations of notional wage changes at zero. Our 1996 paper described the
recursive nature of S; it also described how S will vary with the steady-
state value of π. In steady states with higher inflation, there will be less
truncation, and therefore S will take on lower values: S = S(π), with
S′(π) < 0. S(π) represented here in percentage terms. So the presence of
() , 6 wpa b u tt
e
t −= −
() , 5 ∂∂= FN M W P tt
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equation 6:
The Phillips Curve
We next take the Taylor series expansion of the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the markup equation 5. In addition, we express labor demand in
terms of the unemployment rate, ut, rather than in terms of the employment
rate. This restates equation 5 in log form as
where g is a constant from the Taylor series expansion.
Note that when prices equal price expectations, equation 5′ can be
interpreted as an implicit labor demand function. Since the equation is in
log form, −1/α is the elasticity of demand for labor. That is precisely the
macroeconomic elasticity of the demand for labor that results from the
changing demand for labor according to equation 5 as the real wage
changes for all firms.
Combining equation 5′ with the notional wage equation 6′ yields the
real price that producers think they are setting as
where G = g + a.
In turn, combining equation 7 with equation 2 yields a price Phillips
curve of the form
Relating Unemployment to S
The rate of unemployment that will maintain the steady-state rate of
inﬂation is then
where H is a constant equal to G/[b +α ].
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mines the extent to which lower S will allow lower unemployment to be
maintained at higher levels of inﬂation. And that coefﬁcient is 1/[b +α ].
This coefﬁcient has an intuitive interpretation. The parameter −b is the
slope of the macroeconomic supply of labor curve in (w − p, u) space, and
α is the slope of the labor demand curve in that space. S(π) can be con-
sidered to be a wedge between the actual wage that ﬁrms pay (which is
the basis of their labor demand) and the notional wage. Of course, the
increase in unemployment is equal to the wedge divided by the sum of the
absolute values of the slopes of the two lines.
One can look at what is happening another way. When S(π) rises as π
falls, one or both of two things must happen to keep ﬁrms’ desired prices
equal to expected prices. Either unemployment must grow to reduce the
notional wage, or the marginal product of labor must rise, as it might with
falling employment. The parameter b reﬂects the ﬁrst effect and the param-
eter α the second.
In our two previous papers we assumed that the elasticity of output
with respect to labor was 1. In that case equation 5 implies a constant real
wage or an inﬁnitely elastic macro demand for labor; α equals zero; and
the unemployment effects of nominal rigidity depend only on the slope of
the notional wage equation. But, more generally, the macro elasticity of
demand for labor will matter as well. In the extreme, if the supply of cap-
ital is ﬁxed and the elasticity of substitution of capital for labor is zero, the
macro elasticity of demand for labor will be zero, the denominator of
equation 8 will be inﬁnite, and the S-multiplier will be zero.
Elasticity of Labor Demand
What, then, is a realistic value for α? In general, −α is the elasticity of
the marginal product of labor with respect to labor. Consider ﬁrst what α
would be if capital were ﬁxed. With Cobb-Douglas production it is the
capital coefﬁcient (which is equal to the income share of capital with per-
fect competition in the factor market). More generally, with any produc-
tion function with constant returns to scale, it is (1 − NFN/Y)/s, where FN
is the derivative of F with respect to N, and s is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labor. The numerator is capital’s share if there is
perfect competition.
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ity of substitution is normally assumed to be 1 or perhaps a bit less. These
imply values of α that will not preclude a slope for the price Phillips curve
of 1⁄2. Thus, with conventional values of the parameters of the production
function, equation 8 is consistent with S-multipliers that are quite large.
At business cycle frequencies it is natural to assume that capital is
ﬁxed, but we are concerned with the value of the S-multiplier in the long
run, where there is a permanent trade-off between inﬂation and unemploy-
ment. For these longer-run considerations we should consider the values of
α when capital is variable. Such variability can occur for two reasons: ﬁrst,
domestic saving will increase or decrease with the labor input as output
and employment rise or fall; also, capital is potentially available from
abroad. Both of these factors will cause the supply of capital to be more
elastic and the long-run value of α to be less than with ﬁxed capital. If in
the long run there is an inﬁnitely elastic supply of capital at a ﬁxed cost,
there will be no diminution of the marginal product of labor from the
lower unemployment at all. Indeed, α will be exactly zero and the S(π)
multiplier will be equal to 1/b.
There is another reason why one might suspect that α is quite small or
even negative. We have assumed that ﬁrms mark up over marginal costs,
as they should if they are proﬁt maximizers. However, ﬁrsthand accounts
of pricing suggest that ﬁrms typically include overhead in their costs
when computing prices. If they do this, α will be equal to the elasticity of
the average product of labor with respect to labor, and from Okun’s law
we know that that elasticity—at least in the short run—is positive. This
was the major reason why the benchmark simulations of both of our pre-
vious papers were based on production functions without a declining
marginal product of labor. Output was instead assumed proportional to
labor input. As a result, in these simulations the S-multiplier was 1/b, un-
affected by the considerations of labor demand that are the unﬁnished
business of this paper.
A high macro elasticity of demand for labor is also consistent with a
number of empirical observations. At business cycle frequencies, real
wages show very little variation in response to changes in employment.
From a longer-term perspective, the U.S. economy has absorbed repeated
waves of immigrants with little apparent impact on wages.
6 Similarly, the
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ation of the 1960s,
7 as did the Israeli economy when faced with a wave of
immigration from Russia more recently.
8 Rachel Friedberg and Jennifer
Hunt conclude from a survey of such shocks that a 10 percent increase in
the labor force is associated with at most a 1 percent decline in the wages
of native workers. If the marginal product of labor were very sensitive to
changes in employment (implying a large value for α), one would expect
to see large wage impacts from such changes.
Finally, we showed above how the coefﬁcient on unemployment in the
price Phillips curve is equal to 1 divided by our multiplier. We also noted
that typical estimates for the United States place the value of that coefﬁ-
cient at 0.5. This, too, suggests values for α of considerably less than 1.
9
Micro versus Macro Estimates of Labor Demand
The micro and the macro estimates differ because they make different
assumptions regarding what is ﬁxed. Both concern how a shift in wages
will shift the quantity of labor demanded when the ﬁrm also adjusts its
own price optimally. The macro elasticity assumes that the wage shift
occurs at all ﬁrms; it also assumes that all other ﬁrms adjust their prices
and that, as they do so, aggregate income will change. This macro elastic-
ity can be inferred directly from equation 5 by seeing how the demand for
labor varies as the wage varies relative to the aggregate price level, P
–
. But
aggregate income varies, and the price charged by the individual ﬁrm, P,
corresponds exactly to P
–
. In contrast, the micro elasticity assumes that
the wage shift occurs only at the individual ﬁrm; it further assumes that
aggregate income is constant. The demand for labor varies according to
equation 5, but the demand equation, equation 4, plays a major role. Now




Why, then, are the macro estimates larger than the micro estimates?
We have seen that the major difference between the estimates is that in
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9. In a more elaborate model it is possible for the coefﬁcient of unemployment in the
price Phillips curve to be smaller than the denominator of the S(π) multiplier, if markups
are large and if the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to labor is large.
It seems unlikely, however, that both conditions hold.
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–
varies, and income is held constant, whereas in
the macro demand P/P
–
remains constant, and income varies. The macro
elasticity will be higher than the micro elasticity because it includes the
feedback that occurs when one ﬁrm reduces its output in response to an
increase in costs, thus reducing aggregate income and the demand for the
products of all the other ﬁrms. Thus, an increase in costs produces a larger
change in output at the macro level than at the level of a ﬁrm or industry.
As a result, labor demand elasticities at the ﬁrm or industry level are
smaller than those at the macro level, and high S-multipliers are not con-
tradicted by low elasticities of ﬁrm and industry demand, such as those
reported by Daniel Hamermesh.
10
Table 1 compares four elasticities of the demand for labor. With a
Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital share of output of α, the
macro elasticity of demand for labor with ﬁxed capital will be −1/α. That
will be a relatively large number, say, −4, if α is equal to 0.25. In contrast,
if capital is variable and there is an inﬁnitely elastic supply at a ﬁxed
international cost of capital, the elasticity of the demand for labor will be
inﬁnite.
These macro elasticities are very different from the micro elasticities.
We assume as before that the demand for the ﬁrm’s product is given by
equation 4, with an elasticity of demand for its product with respect to its
own price of β; the ﬁrm takes the prices of other ﬁrms and aggregate
income as ﬁxed. If capital is ﬁxed, the elasticity of demand for labor by
the ﬁrm will be −β/(1 −α+α β ). With variable capital and a ﬁxed capital
cost, the elasticity becomes −(1 −α )β−α . Note that with both ﬁxed and
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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Table 1. Elasticities of Demand for Labor under Different Assumptions
a





d −β/[1 −α+α β ] −(1 −α )β−α
Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
a. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with a share of capital of α in all cases.
b. Capital is freely available at a ﬁxed cost.
c. Labor is demanded up to the point where its marginal revenue product equals the real wage.
d. Firms or industries assume that the prices of all other ﬁrms and aggregate output are ﬁxed. The elasticity of demand for their
own product is β.
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responding micro elasticities.
Summarizing Theory and Practice
The simulations of inﬂation-unemployment trade-offs in our two earlier
papers assumed that the macroeconomic elasticity of labor demand was
high—that is, that the marginal product of labor rises slowly as the quan-
tity of labor declines. Because this assumption appears to run counter to
conventional estimates of the microeconomic elasticity of labor demand,
these simulations might seem misleading. However, there is good reason
to think that the macroeconomic elasticity would be much larger than the
microeconomic elasticity, and a wide array of macroeconomic data is
consistent with this logic.
The Second Act
Our 1996 paper described the effects of inﬂation due to a shock, S, to
real wages resulting from money wage rigidity. That shock rises as inﬂa-
tion falls. Our 2000 paper allowed for another possible source of such a
shock. There, as inﬂation approaches zero, wages or prices are set increas-
ingly with only nominal terms in mind. This is consistent with the use of
money as a unit of account: when inﬂation is low, people think in nominal
rather than in real terms. That paper calculated S(π) from the ignorance of
inﬂationary expectations in wage equations. Similar effects will also occur
if price setters, rather than wage setters, ignore inﬂationary expectations.
The previous analysis regarding the value of the S-multiplier carries over
from the wage-rigidity model to the expectations-ignorance model. In
both cases the effects of S on equilibrium unemployment were of signiﬁ-
cant size mainly because of the implicit assumption that the macro elas-
ticity of labor demand is very high.
Estimating S
Beyond ﬁnding economically important values of the S-multiplier, our
1996 paper estimated a signiﬁcant trade-off between inﬂation and unem-
ployment for another reason. Our estimates of S, not just of its multiplier,
George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens 43
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wages. It is useful here, just by way of reminder, to indicate why we seem-
ingly deviate from other investigators by eliminating important biases in
their estimates of S.
The standard alternative method for estimating S is to posit that the dis-
tribution of wage changes would be symmetric in the absence of money
wage rigidity, and to use the counterfactual distribution to compute the
impact of having the negative money wage changes “swept up” to zero.
11
The asymmetry of the wage distribution does provide a good diagnostic
test for the existence of money wage rigidity,
12 but three biases arise in
using this asymmetry to calculate the value of S. The ﬁrst two of these
come from underestimation of the wage change truncation.
13 Wage change
distributions (including those used to estimate S) typically have very large
and frequent reporting errors. It is easy to see that such reporting errors
will seriously affect the amount of asymmetry in the data. For example, if
there is no true negative wage change, all of the observations below zero
will be spurious. Reconstruction of the wage change distribution to restore
symmetry then seriously underestimates the amount of truncation. Since
we wrote our paper, many authors have provided estimates of nominal
rigidity that correct for this measurement error. All suggest that failure to
take measurement error into account leads to signiﬁcant understatements
of the extent of downward nominal rigidity in nearly all data sets.
14
The second difﬁculty with this method of estimating S arises because
the effect of wage truncation on wages will be cumulative: previous peri-
ods’ truncations may still be affecting this period’s wages. In our paper
we developed estimates of the truncation that were independent of report-
ing error. We also developed a method of recursion that allowed us to take
account of this cumulative effect of wage truncation. This factor is not
important in normal times but becomes very important as the average rate
of wage inﬂation approaches zero.
This brings us to our third cause for the underestimation of S. Wage
asymmetries, of course, have been measured at historic levels of inﬂation,
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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12. See also Kahn (1997).
13. See McLaughlin (1994).
14. See Dickens and others (2006) for a review and error-corrected estimates of down-
ward nominal rigidity for a wide range of countries.
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theory and our own simulations say that wage change truncation increases
nonlinearly as inflation falls toward zero. Our explicit modeling of this
nonlinearity constitutes a third reason why our estimates of S were so
high for inﬂation that is close to zero.
Conclusion
In this paper we have completed some unﬁnished business. We have
given an intuitive explanation for why our estimates of the effects of low
inﬂation on unemployment are quite large. We have also justiﬁed the rea-
sons for our choice of the parameter responsible for this conclusion. In
particular, we have shown how the macro demand for labor will enter the
long-run trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment. And we have fur-
ther discussed why very low estimates of such a demand for labor can be
ignored in assessing the trade-offs between inﬂation and unemployment.
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General Discussion
Lawrence Summers suggested that although no one has explicitly rejected
the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry analysis, no central bank has explicitly adopted
that analysis in making monetary policy. The idea that the wage mechanism
behaves differently at 1 percent annual inﬂation than at 21⁄2 percent inﬂation
does not appear to be an important factor in central bank decisionmaking.
Insofar as central banks have adopted higher inflation targets, this has
occurred not because of concern about unemployment, but because of
concern about the implications of deﬂation for real interest rates.
George Perry replied that the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry ideas actually did
get some attention at the Federal Reserve and other central banks. A common
theme in the literature before the mid-1990s was that zero inﬂation is ideal,
even though people have understood the potential negative consequences
of deﬂation for a long time. Therefore the apparent decision by the Federal
Reserve not to pursue zero inﬂation may reﬂect some concern about the
trade-off with unemployment.
William Dickens added that the Bank of New Zealand had expressly
considered this research when making its decision to increase its inﬂation
target. Further, when many economists were advocating zero inﬂation in the
1990s, he, Akerlof, and Perry argued that this option should be taken off
the table, and this has since happened. In fact, all inﬂation-targeting central
banks currently target inﬂation in the 1 to 2 percent range.
10922-04b_Akerlof Discussion.qxd  1/25/08  11:11 AM  Page 4710922-04b_Akerlof Discussion.qxd  1/25/08  11:11 AM  Page 48